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REVOLUTION FROM SIBIU (1989)
Revoluția din Sibiu (1989)

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Abstract: *Sibiu is one of the three key points of the bloody events of 1989, with Timișoara and Bucharest. However, considering the large number of dead and wounded (99 dead and 272 wounded), Sibiu is the city with most deaths reported to population. If Sibiu in 1993 triggered a conflict secrecy, unknown by the public, between SRI and the Cotroceni Palace on the report by SRI Sibiu on the events during the revolution in the city. This is because the information it contained and nature revealing as to who had caused deaths in Sibiu.*

Key words: communism, December '89, Sibiu, revolution.

In this process we aim to treat our actions Sibiu garrison, commanded by Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir at the time.

The research methodology was not a very complex one. Thus, in this study, we appealed to the critical examination and rigorous bibliographical sources by *correlation* and *comparison*, managing to notice the differences and similarities of historical information that we could extract and which presented good arguments. Thus, according to March Bloch,¹ in terms of multiple causation, it must offer an answer to the question *why?* As for instance, why were such bloody actions possible? *And who caused them?* That might be the cause. By the document *analysis method*² (for instance of official documents, statistics, data obtained during studies, press materials, etc.) we were able to better understand the course of events from December '89 in the city of Sibiu.

Referring to the bloody events in Sibiu, we mention that they can be divided into two stages: 1) before 22 December and 2) after December 22.

Before 22 December 1989

Regarding the SRI report that we mentioned above, we wish to emphasize that before December 22 we could notice that there were two events that have drawn the attention of the security and of the military counterintelligence. The first of these is the basis of several columns entrance of the city's cars registered in the USSR

¹ Marc Bloch, *The Case for history*, Cluj-Napoca, Tribune Publishing House, 2007.

² Sorin Dan Sandor, „*Methods and techniques of research in social sciences*”, <http://www.apubb.ro/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Suport-MTCS-Ro.pdf>, accessed 4.IV.2015.

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*„in which were two-four men, usually young people, who do not hotel, sleeping in cars and realizing contacts with Romanian citizens”.*³ The second event, presented in SRI report describes the hot points at which the shooter. Besides this, we also find a mention about the presence of fighters DIA (Department of Military Intelligence), before the bloody events in missions time is the struggle: *„An important aspect is the presence in Sibiu, in the year of 1989 of a detachment of soldiers from the Battalion 404 Buzău-depth research, belonging by the Information attached to the Army General Staff. The soldiers concerned were in plain clothes, armed with walkie-talkies and made observations and photographs of the buildings located in the vicinity of units of the Defence Ministry and MI and recorded points in their vicinity or other strategic points in the city on a map, as the hotels Continental Boulevard, BTT, UM 01473. Coincidentally or not they were hot spots in the events of 1989”.*⁴

The case of the DIA agents is narrated by Colonel (r) Ioan Rusan, former head of department of Anti-Stasi Special Unit of the Department of State Security 0110, Anti-KGB dubbed, in an interview with Alex Mihai Stoenescu: *„It was a very interesting case in Sibiu. We traced operatives sent in Sibiu for recognition, but they were not strangers, but from Battalion 404. There were guys at DIA. I watched, I did not understand what they were doing there, but no longer the case to Security, but UM 01512, that is to Dragomir. Before the event, Dragomir was involved in their operation in receiving, concealing, feeding them, they start again Dragomir being shaped conspiring and acting but without their presence or their missions being recorded somewhere. Preparing the ground for what they did in December. Roofs, bridges houses, streets and alleys. Security Sibiu I discovered that are unusual and arrested him. They had to admit, that they were DIA agents”.*⁵

Regarding the presence of officers on the territory of the city, we want to emphasize that it was known at the time that DIA deals with missions for „testing vigilance”, but this time we cannot talk about that because the tasks in question were removed from the mold. *„Such vigilance testing operations were in missions DIA unit in Buzău, only to come out well in control, unit commanders concerned were usually announced before discreetly. They are stealing his hat alone. This time the mission was a very strange conduct, we can not speak of a mission to test the vigilance of military units as long as the fighters photographed and marked on the map hotels in Sibiu, blocks of flats and houses in the city bridges.*

³ Alex Mihai Stoenescu, *History of coups in Romania, volume 4, part II*, București, Rao, 2004, p. 574.

⁴ Romanian Intelligence Service, *Report on the December 1989 events in Timiș*, pp. 12-13.

⁵ Alex Mihai Stoenescu, *Interviews about revolution*, București, Rao, 2009, pp. 123-124.

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Security maps remained caught in possession, constitute evidence by notes written on them, the fact that the action was not covered by DLA in testing vigilance”⁶.

The two events outlined above demonstrates that it was known, what was going to happen or simply meant Security subsequent maps.

Romanian Army has been put on the alert throughout Romania as a result of the demonstrations in Timișoara. On the evening of December 17, 1989, 19:00, General Ion Hortopan, commander of Information and tanks, sent personally thelt. col. Dragomir Aurel, called „*Radu the Handsome*”. This indicative became operational through its effects only when triggered by surprise, or in case of a risk, triggering an attack on one/several foreign armies. The order was illegal (no civilians had weapons, demonstrating legal according to Art. 28 of the Constitution of the Republic that proclaimed the state of emergency).

After the issue of a battle by General Milea, the security units and barracks inside and outside, armed patrols and equipped with war ammunition watched all the time were reinforced.

The day after Nicolae Ceaușescu’s televised speech, that in the morning of 21 December 1989 lt. col. Dragomir Aurel ordered assembly staff and students of UM 01512 Sibiu, Plateau school, during which he made the apology after Ceaușescu’s communist regime and gave the floor to some of the participants who condemned the demonstrations in Timișoara. Moreover after the meeting, students from UM 01512 were introduced in lecture halls where, in order lt. al. Dragomir gave control work on „*position of our Party and State, Comrade Ceaușescu to events in Timișoara*”. Meanwhile lt. col. Dragomir, as stated by witnesses, made public statements about the need to use weapons against demonstrators. In December 1989 the garrison from Sibiu had a formidable force in the sense that there were 11 military units on alert with a mood induced by the commander of the military.⁷

This phenomenon, out in the street, not late to appear for the morning of 21.12.1989, around 8:30 a group of about 30 people from the former enterprise „Balance” in Sibiu headed to downtown . Being a very small number of demonstrators were easily dispersed by police within MI. Several people were detained

⁶ Idem, *History of Coups in Romania, volume 4, part II*, p. 575.

⁷ Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Justice, Department of Military Prosecutor, file no. 55/P/1993 indictment prepared by Magistrate Brigadier General Dan Voinea, pp. 3-4.

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but released later research. Shortly after, demonstrators in increasing numbers rallied in the hotel „Boulevard” in Republic Square (now „Revolution Square”) in the center of Sibiu continuing to shout slogans against the regime and even to carry out violent actions as they were for example, breaking windows at a few bookstores where the books were removed by Nicolae Ceaușescu who have burned.⁸

After being informed of the events, the first secretary, Nicu Ceaușescu, ordered to be sent to the market party „Shield”, subordinated special militia group whose members were trained specifically for interventions to restore order.

The latter were received with hostility by protesters, and their car was overthrown and burned. This was reported immediately as being Nicu Ceaușescu's. „*At that time Lt. al. Aurel Dragomir, located near the first secretary and asked him its agreement to restore order because the militia these are not worthless*”.⁹ We note that this is where Lt. al. Dragomir receives „power” needed to restore order, and the army came into play. The permission granted by the first secretary with the approval of General Milea and General Ion Hortopan. I note further that it not only opened fire against demonstrators but also against MI staff.

On 21.12.1989, Dragomir orders, from 10:00, removing his military in Sibiu, to confront the demonstrators, these forces being backed shortly firefighters and soldiers of the battalion Security Sibiu. The first victims appear with the arrival of one of the detachments of students. The soldiers were greeted with jeers and stones and incendiary bottles. „*In this situation, Capt. Cristian Teodorescu ordered warning shot, executed order his subordinates. It is now recorded the first victims in Sibiu*”.¹⁰

Following this incident, Aurel Dragomir reported to Bucharest to General Ioan Hortopan that due to the opening of fire by the military, one of the students made several casualties among the demonstrators. In the afternoon of December 21, extend public demonstrations in different areas of the city, so that the number of protesters increased to several thousand. This rapid expansion is due to open fire on demonstrators by military school students and killing one of the protesters addition injuring another four. There are various statements by witnesses who claim that the person killed by gunshot had been shot by another demonstrator, which is

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

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totally untrue because it would have been shot from behind while forensic report clearly shows that the bullet entered through the front and out back.

After December 1989

Thereafter, Lt. col. Aurel Dragomir took only chaotic decisions regarding opening fire, especially the MI inspectorate, and the request made by the aviation regiment 01989 (Commander Nicolae Dochinoiu) to lift helicopters in the air.

The given orders to open fire are inexplicable, especially since it had received numerous orders, which were addressed in Bucharest for a ceasefire *„between 12:30 to 4:30 p. m. Inspectorate fired on the building, including arms hard. Although, in Bucharest, col. Părcălăbescu, General Ilie Ceaușescu, the Military Prosecutor Voinea asked Lt. al. Dragomir Aurel to order ceasefire”*.¹¹

It noted that General Ștefan Gușă, head of the MStM, conveyed clearly television as military units in Sibiu order to withdraw to barracks and cease fire. Apparently Lt. Colonel Dragomir kept in touch only with General Stănculescu. The latter told him to appear on his responsibility, because Dragomir misinformed him on Stănculescu saying that is attacked, something totally untrue.

A fundamental mistake was made when they were sent to separate units in the same place in order to catch terrorists, firing into each other eventually. *„On December 22, 1989, around 12:30, a formation of cadres and students of UM 01606, led by Octavian Niță captain was ordered to occupy and defend mobile building on Boulevard Michael the Brave, located near and within sight of UM 01512, body B. In the latter unit was formed, to order, a formation of snipers, led by Major Emil Damian disposed in the central pavilion. Following rumors regarding employment phones by terrorists, not tested this information and knowing the order given first formations, personnel UM 01512-B shot and killed Captain Niță Octavian floor while inspect the building”*.¹²

Section Military Prosecutor left us an overview of the tragedy at Sibiu *„is mentioned the fact that although the buildings Inspectorate MI were subsequently executed drawdown repeated and intense from UM 01512 Sibiu, though no frame MI did not was killed or injured in the building inspectorate in firing positions in the windows or doors, which is likely to refute the statements of soldiers from UM 01512 Sibiu who usually argue version*

¹¹ Romanian Intelligence Service, *Report on the December 1989 events in Sibiu*, p. 17.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 19.

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strikes that gave it to the disbursements from the premises MI the military unit. The same conclusion can be drawn in any subsequent determination of a small number of bullet holes on the walls of buildings 01512 UM Sibiu and the lack of military casualties are in these buildings. On 12.22.1989 were detained and isolated inside UM Sibiu most teaching MI 01512, and in the coming days surrendered or were arrested and office staff, each of which is subject to research on the use of weapons and previous work, after which solutions were ordered not to prosecute, except for a few frames that were prosecuted. On the night of 22/23.12.1989, and in the coming days in Sibiu continued to draw. This was due to generalized state of confusion and uncertainty, false information being circulated even through the media, alarming rumors spread by various unidentified generalized suspicion that caused minor to be hyperbolized gestures. State of panic and uncertainty has been amplified by a new element represented by lifting into the air by helicopters UM 01989 Sibiu, who carried fire with machine guns on board at some buildings where it was supposed to shoot the diversionary elements. Also they were found deficiencies in command of troops. Thus, in many cases, soldiers, excitedly prolonged stress due to which they were subjected, opened fire on his own initiative, often unjustified. There have been cases where people living in the vicinity of the military were shot in their houses, believing that there was fired on military units".¹³

An example of the airstrike was carried on worker Nicholas Crace. On December 23, around noon, going the route Dumbrăvii with a woman who had a conversation on the street: „When a crosswalk to cross to the Municipal cemetery, I saw a helicopter flying at the height of a telegraph pole, immediately began to <<size>> bullets pavement around us (...). The helicopters were military, I saw clearly. The woman who was with me started screaming. I pushed her to the ground and was housed under the cover portions of the cemetery. For me and threw a grenade from a helicopter. I heard a big bang and I collapsed to the ground. When I had broken up all the meat from the legs. The woman went to call for help. After 15 minutes came and I took a bus from ITS (Sibiu Transport Company). When I get into it, the helicopter came back from the cemetery, had shot there by crypts. They started firing and over the bus, but no longer hurt anyone”.¹⁴

Dead and Wounded

¹³ Supreme Court of Justice, Department of Military Prosecution, *Synthesis issues resulting from investigations conducted by the Military Prosecutor from 1989*, pp. 188-189.

¹⁴ Newspaper *Adevărul*, „terrorists”, hunted by Romanian Army helicopters, April 10, 2010.

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I present below some of the indictment report of the magistrate Dan Voinea, so we can do a better picture of the events happened. With the opening of fire by soldiers of UM 01512 and other military garrison commanded by Lieutenant Sibiu al. Dragomir Aurel dated 22.12.1989 more casualties resulted. *„So, after 12:00 on the day of 22.12.1989 when some demonstrators instigated against staff MI, breaking into the building IMJ Sibiu, most workers MI, trying to seek refuge in the courtyard UM 01512 jumping over fence net unit at the checkpoint because he could not enter the Military unit due to a large group of demonstrators who were blocking access through it and behaved violently towards workers MI, caught in the area. The violence culminated in an unexpected reaction military MND who until by the aforementioned collaborated perfectly frames MI, and unjustifiably opened fire with all their weapons, including heavy weapons against the building IMJ Sibiu and workers MI”*.¹⁵

This bloody incident, acknowledged in part by Colonel Moses Gheorghe in that it consistently said it fired on groups of frames MI, as they jumped the fence into the yard UM 01512, recounted such Popa Vasile: *„After we passed fence in the yard of the military unit without warning fired toward inspectorate and us. We fell down in front of the Command considering that we abstain. Say that I cried since the fence we're coming to surrender, we col. Vasile Popa Head of the Municipal Militia. Prostrate position I continued to shout above asking to stop firing on us”*.

The unit UM 01512, has pulled virtually all types of weapons or tanks, machine guns TAB and grenades antitank AG7, with the obvious purpose of destroying buildings headquarters Inspectorate MI-Sibiu and kill persons in this building, which led to the destruction of the building and property of the aforementioned, as well as killing and injuring several people. *„The documents drawn up that UM 01512 until 12/28/1989 were drawn 67.320 7.62 mm bullet cartridges short ordinary 44.800 cartridges of 7.62 mm pistol, 4400 cartridges of 7.62 mm bullet usual long , 13.200 7.62 mm cartridges maneuvering and 2648 cartridges of 7.62 mm bullet incendiary short”*.¹⁶

From all said, we see that the main character of their unfortunate happenings in Sibiu is Lt. al. Dragomir Aurel. The latter is the main culprit for opening fire and crimes in those days, he had the entire garrison command in Sibiu, which had 11 units military garrison at the time. Although there have been numerous

¹⁵ Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Justice, Department of Military Prosecutor, file no. 55/P/1993 indictment prepared by Magistrate Brigadier General Dan Voinea, p. 135.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 152.

"Revolution from Sibiu (1989)", *Astra Salvensis*, III, 6, p. 112-119

pressure on Ceasefire, Dragomir refused to follow direct orders received from Bucharest, it is one non-compliance of orders to cease fire. He kept in touch with General Atanasie Stănculescu, the main pawn in the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, which he misinformed constantly telling him that is attacked, it totally untrue, and asking permission to defend himself, Dragomir being attacked by terrorists security.

The paradox is that in 1990, Aurel Dragomir was considered a „Sibiu hero” who cleaned the city of terrorists. In the meantime, the optics was changed, while he became „Sibiu executioner”.