

# POLISH POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM. THE DISCUSSION ON RELIGIOUS SUBJECTS BETWEEN ANDRZEJ WISZOWATY AND GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ, FROM 60S OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

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**Abstract:** *Poland was considered to be a country of freedom, country without stakes. Not only because the principle of freedom of the nobility, the so-called golden freedom, as the basis of the noble system of the Republic, Serenissima Respublica, as they called their state, but also thanks to religious freedom which functioned before the Partition of Poland. An important document in this dimension was the resolution of the Confederation of Warsaw from January 28, 1573, established at Convocative Sejm. Contained provisions for ensuring freedom of religion for nobility in the Commonwealth, guaranteed unconditional and eternal peace between believers of different religions. Confederation of Warsaw assured equality with the Catholics and the care of the state. This document is considered to be the beginning of the legally guaranteed religious tolerance not only in Poland but also in the world. It is also a certain similarity between Poland and one of the regions in Romania, Transylvania, which also boasted for a considerable religious tolerance. Confederation is undoubtedly important Polish contribution to the history of Europe and the world. In the article attention will be paid to one of the manifestations of Polish freedom philosophy - the philosophy of Polish brothers during the Reformation. Polish Brethren were called also Arians, Socinians, Antitrinitarians. Article is devoted to teoretical analysis of the achievements of this religious sect. Particular attention will be paid to the theoretical achievements, discussing issues of religious dogma, first and foremost authors such as: Adam Gostawski and Andrzej Wiszowaty. I will undertake the issues off important discussion, from the seventeenth century, between Wiszowaty and Leibniz, the subject of which was the dogma of the Holy Trinity. Antitrinitarians postulated rational approach to religious matters, self-study of the Bible, do not forbid anyone to believe in the way considers appropriate for them.*

**Keywords:** Polish philosophy of freedom, Socinians, Polish Brethren, Andrzej Wiszowaty (1608-1678); theological discussion, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), political philosophy.

## Holy Trinity in religious-philosophical discussion

The ratio of Socynian to the dogma of the Holy Trinity, illustrates discussion turned out in the 60s of the seventeenth century. Between Andrzej Wiszowaty (1608-1678)<sup>1</sup> and Gottfrid Wilhelm Leibniz.

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<sup>1</sup> Andrzej Wiszowaty coa Pierzchała was Polish socynian theologian, writer, philosopher, son of the Stanisław Wiszowaty, Arian, and Agnieszka Socyn, only

Exchange of arguments between the seventeenth century philosophers reports Stefan Huber in his position: „*Logic and faith in the dispute between Andrzej Wiszowaty and Gottfrid Wilhelm Leibniz on the Holy Trinity*” - *Logika i wiara w sporze Andrzeja Wiszowatego i Gottfrida Wilhelma Leibniza o Trójce Świętą* (polish title). Intermediary in the exchange of argument between Wiszowatym, and Leibniz, was Johann Christian von Boineburg (1622-1772), a high official at the Catholic court in Mainz, supporter of irenicism and therefore credible interlocutor for the Arian and evangelical Christian.

### **Ars disputandi-rules of the seventeenth century philosophical discussion**

It should be noted that the logic and ars disputandi are agreed among themselves with assumptions about the rational nature of religion. In this specific agreement of ars disputandi is created kind of *political correctness*. According to indicated above political correctness: the absolute priority in all contentious issues is the principle that every person is allowed to believe in their own way, provided that it does not force anyone for the adoption of its contents of faith. One can indicate the contradictions in the content of other faith communities, but this should definitely stop and refrain from any other form of influence on someone's faith. The same we can find at the Leibniz *Theodicy*, for example in included in the discussion on theological truths.<sup>2</sup>

As it was indicated by Huber in his book, discussion about the dogma of the Holy Trinity with Leibniz, began Wiszowaty, by sending Boineburg, probably as a part of a more extensive, longer lasting correspondence, a letter in which he presented 7 arguments in which he deny the dogma of the Trinity. He asked then to answer him or response by mediation of defenders of the dogma. The letter reminded the short treatise: *Objectiones quaedam contra Trinitatem* formulated by Wiszowaty.<sup>3</sup> The correspondence took place in 1665, while in the year.

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daughter of Faustus Socinus (Italian religious reformer, theologian and polemicist, writer and poet.) and Elizabeth Morsztyn, the name inherited from her grandmother from the father's side, Agnes Socinus (Agnese Sozzini) from home Petrucci, closely related to the Popes Pius II and Pius III.

<sup>2</sup> S. Huber, *Logika i wiara w sporze Andrzeja Wiszowatego i Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza o Trójce św.*, Warszawa, 2005, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup> A. Wiszowaty, *Objectiones quaedam contra Trinitatem* was probably written in the year 1665. Huber indicates that *Religio rationalis*, Andrzej Wiszowaty most important work, could exist already in 1671, six years after writing the previous treaty, if it was created

1669 Wiszowaty received a Leibniz response, entitled-*Defenso Trinitatis*. The discussion was conducted in accordance with the requirements of, so-called: *Ars disputandi*, a stake in the exchange of arguments, 'fight for logic' was freedom of belief in the Holy Trinity. Wiszowaty acted as: *opponens*, undermine the thesis of the second participant of the debate, while *respondens*-responded to logical allegations. Leibniz as a *respondens* tried to reject the Antitrinitarian arguments, claiming that they are not sufficient to overthrow the dogma of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation. Arguments submitted by Wiszowaty not convinced Leibniz. Formal requirement of *ars disputandi* says that if strictly logical will be demonstrated contradiction of specific religious content-they should be rejected. Huber stated that: „*Więcej, nie tylko uznają i spełniają ten wymóg, lecz także uwewnętrzniają go i łączą z całością swoich koncepcji religijno-filozoficznych*”. „*More, they (Wiszowaty and Leibniz) not only recognized and fulfilled this requirement, but also internalize it and unite with their whole religious and philosophical concepts*”.

Wiszowaty denies the dogma of the Holy Trinity and advocates for the freedom to rational criticism of all existing religious content. Wiszowaty realized his strategy by adopting the role of *opponens* fits into his overall concept of a rational faith.. Similarly Leibniz realized in correspondence with Wiszowaty the requirements of *ars disputandi*. *Respondens* privilege, lies in the fact that he postulates only the possibility of the thesis, for which he stands, in turn *opponens* must postulate the truthfulness of presented thesis. Leibniz nowhere stated that the dogma of the Holy Trinity can be shown in the strict sens, as well as does not claim that can be prove the impossibility of strict proof of the internal contradictions of this religious dogma. According to Leibniz evidence that have been presented to him by Antitrinitarian are insufficient, they do not constitute strict proof of internal contradictions of the dogma of the Trinity. With the concept of *ars disputandi*, involve also the the ratio of the two philosophers to a certain liberalism in matters of faith. According to Leibniz, we can not force anyone to believe in the Holy Trinity. Similarly to Wiszowaty not dare to prohibit profess of this belief.<sup>4</sup> As long as there is no strict argument to rebut

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later, the farthest in the year. 1678, according to quoted by Zbigniew Ogonowski, findings of Lech Szczucki. *Religio rationalis* (latin)-title of Polish edition is: *O religii zgodnej z rozumem czyli traktat o postugiwaniu sie sadem rozumu takze w sprawach teologicznych i religijnych*-in english: *On religion compatible with the reason,, treatise on the use of the judgment of reason in theological and religious matters*.

<sup>4</sup> S. Huber, *Logika i wiara w sporze Andrzeja Wiszowatego i Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza o Trójce św.*, p. 16. Let me quote: „*Inaczej mówiąc, logika i ars disputandi uzgodnione zostają z*

discussed dogma, i. e. The internal contradiction of the dogma strictly not been proven, it can still believe if there is a reason, even if there is no specific proof. It should be noted that the starting point of discussion among philosophers was absolute incompatibility concerning dogma of the Holy Trinity. On the other hand, a crucial common element between them is the assertion that faith is compatible with reason.<sup>5</sup> Common opponents of these philosophers are all conferring the fundamental role and impossible to overcome to the difference between reason and faith, therefore all: atheists, fideists, etc. (although Huber sees some fideistic elements in Wiszowaty *Religio rationalis*)<sup>6</sup> attitude to the relation between faith and reason, represented by those philosophers follows from their relation to the historical situation in the first half of the seventeenth century. Faith should be a rational, which could prevent conflicts, to free-man from the conflictual potential. The ideal of replacement of religious arguments, is the kind of discussion that allows to pursue the development of their own religious identity through deeper reflection and soothes the customs, as Huber says, in contact with others. Realization of this requirement is related to the granting of freedom to believe in the mysteries of the faith, for which insists Leibniz and the freedom to rational criticism of all religious dogma, which can be called a sine qua non of philosophy represented by Wiszowaty.

It should be noted that before Wiszowaty, presented fully formed philosophical apparatus used for overthrow of the dogma of the Holy Trinity in *Religio rationalis*, consult his tool with the defenders of the dogma. Positions represented by philosophers at the theological level are radically opposed, constitute the highest and most appropriate level of

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*zalożeniami dotyczącymi racjonalnej natury religii w taki sposób, że powstaje swego rodzaju polityczna poprawność. Wedle niej absolutne pierwszeństwo we wszystkich spornych kwestiach ma zasada, że każdemu człowiekowi wolno wierzyć na swój własny sposób, pod warunkiem, że nie zmusza nikogo do przyjęcia swoich treści wiary. Wolno co prawda wskazywać na sprzeczności w treściach wiary innych wspólnot, lecz na tym należy zdecydowanie skończyć i zamiechać wszelkich innych form wpływu na czyjąś wiarę. Podobnie rzecz przedstawia się u Leibniza. W Teodycei, dokładniej w zawartych w niej rozważaniach o prawdach teologicznych jak np. Trójca św., znajdujemy te same lub podobne narzędzia jak w odpowiedzi na zarzuty Wiszowatego”.*

<sup>5</sup> J. Stegman Starszy, *O rozumie [in:] Socynianizm polski*, [ed.] Z. Ogonowski, Warszawa 1960, s. 134.

<sup>6</sup> S. Huber, *Logika i wiara w sporze Andrzeja Wiszowatego i Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza o Trójcę św.* In the polemic with Olgierd Narbutt, Huber notes Narbutt ignorance, says that he may not know *Religio rationalis* because claimed that Wiszowaty is radical rationalist, and had nothing to do with those who could be rationalists in criticism, and fideists in program. According to Huber in Wiszowaty *Religio rationalis* appear fideistic accents, with which it is difficult to disagree.

*contradiction*-opposition. On the other hand, as it was noted by Huber, anthropological base of their relationship is to alleviate extreme contrasts. This is particularly evident outside the outlined correspondence discussion of authors. Especially in the works in which they conduct positive narration, without explicit reference to views of opponent, outside *ars disputandi*. In his *Religio rationalis* Wiszowaty repeats the same rhetorical treatments, using identical tools as applied in a position that properly constituted, extended version of the narrative conducted in discussion with Leibniz, namely *Objectiones quaedam contra Trinitatem*.

Wiszowaty applies critical logic, in contrast to Leibniz who uses presumption logic. There are two important differences in the approach of these thinkers. Wiszowaty draws attention to the potential contradictions in their deliberations, consistently applies critical logic. Also in his interpretation of the Holy Scripture is critical, looking for contradictions in its various interpretations. „His judgments are formed from a combination of positive religious content with other content, which follow from the observation of the world and self-understanding, and are consistent with the first”- „Jego sady pozytywne powstają z połączenia treści religijnych z innymi treściami, które wynikając z obserwacji świata oraz autorefleksji rozumu i są niesprzeczne z pierwszymi”.

### Context of *Religio rationalis*

Context outlined in *Religio rationalis* is important when it comes to understanding the so-called living Socynian faith internalized by Wiszowaty and the role which played in it applied by him logical arguments, as well as the ethical position which he occupied-As Stefan Huber emphasized „Logic Tools served Wiszowaty simultaneously for two purposes: the first, to uncompromising demonstrate contradiction of the dogma of the Holy Trinity. Second, to enable respecting the faith of defenders of the Holy Trinity in the interpersonal dimension”. „Narzędzia logiczne służą Wiszowatemu jednocześnie do dwóch celów: po pierwsze, bezkompromisowo mają wykazać sprzeczność dogmatu Trójcy św., po drugie, umożliwić respektowanie wiary obrońców Trójcy św. w wymiarze międzyludzkim”.<sup>7</sup> Logic and *ars disputandi*, in conjunction with the notion of a *rational nature of religion*, become a kind of *political correctness*

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<sup>7</sup> S. Huber, *Logika i wiara w sporze Andrzeja Wiszowatego i Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza o Trójcę św.*, p. 16.

*interpretation* of the debate that took place in 17<sup>th</sup> century<sup>8</sup> in matters of religious debate waged between representatives of opposing positions.

In the philosophy of Leibniz preserved original, defensive strategy of presenting views on matters of faith. A cardinal principle represented by the two thinkers, despite different theological positions in the field of anthropology is that everyone have the right to shape their own personal religious beliefs as long as they do not appear pretensions to impose them on others, people with opposing views. At the same time there is right to indicate the contradictions in the belief systems different from our own, but there should be no further interference or naked coercion aimed at changing those views. Also in the later writings of these authors is clear preserve of principles of religious rationalism, both in relation to the plane of the: man - God and the plane on which interact: man - man. Huber formulated on this basis thesis that it is possible far-reaching anthropological agreement despite not alleviating clear theological contradictions. Observation of the exchange of views between authors (from XVII century Europe-Wiszowaty and Leibniz) is important because of the possibility of peace between different, sometimes conflicting religious beliefs. An important feature of the debate held in the seventeenth century between already old Wiszowaty and 23 years old young Leibniz is the lack of emotional elements in this discussion, it is conducted in a formal language, authors do not refer to their own religious feelings, which are often due to - *petitio principii* - convict debaters to the lack of consensus and dialogue. They doomed to succumb to emotions, that need to be alive.

The Wiszowaty concept of faith developed in discussion with Leibniz, adopting more mature form in the aforementioned *Religio rationalis*. The important merit of Wiszowaty was popularization of the idea according to which all elements of faith are subject to rational interpretation, and that dogmas can be break down on the rational way. The dominant assertion of Polish Arian is the view according to which every person has the right to doubt, to have doubts about all elements of faith and may seek, in the way of rational inquiry, and therefore the

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<sup>8</sup> J. Crell, „*Do not force anyone to religion, because it will born only hypocrisy and cynicism*”, Polish: „*Nie nale¿y nikogo zmuszaæ do religii, gdy¿ rodzi to tylko obłudê i cynizm*”, - „*We have shown in the previous chapter, that heretics demanding religious freedom are demanding only for not cause them harm and to not punished them for heresy, a word, that in the field of secular law will be maintain peace with them*”, - „*Wykazaliœmy w poprzednim rozdziale, ¿e heretycy domagajacy siê wolnoœci religijnej ¿adaja tylko tego, aby nie wyrzadzano im œkôd i aby nie karano ich za herezje, sãowem, aby w dziedziznie praw œwieckich utrzymywano z nimi pokój*”. From the Treaty: *O wolnoœci sumienia* „*About freedom of conscience*” [in:] Z. Ogonowski, *Socynianizm polski*.

logical operations of the mind, to prove their contradiction. Also surprising Wiszowaty attitude consists in the involvement of „the eye of the spirit” - in Polish: „oko ducha” for the unimportant matters, and that people are willing to turn a blind when it comes to religious matters.<sup>9</sup>

In *Religio rationalis* concluded that anyone who says that believes in something but do not understand this in fact do not believe but just thinketh something. Andrzej Wiszowaty infers that what is recognized by faith is not opposed to what is confirmed by rational evidence, and to what human reason comprehends.<sup>10</sup> The subject of faith is, according Socynianin rational soul, a special gift from God. Faith can not exist without the use of intellect and reason. Andrzej Wiszowaty stressed that: „*Wiara zaś o tyle tkwi w intelekcie czyli w rozumnej duszy, że sam intelekt czyli rozum działaniem swym przyczynia się jakoś do zrozumienia spraw wiary, ponieważ wiara nie może powstać, ani istnieć w człowieku bez poprzedniego zrozumienia czyli poznania rzeczy, w którą ma się wierzyć (...)*”. (Faith whereas, so far, is in the intellect which means a rational soul, the alone intellect means reason by his operations contributes somehow to understand matters of faith, because faith can not arise or exist in a person without previous understanding means knowledge of things, in which will be believe). The main basis of religion should be personal study of Holy Scripture and the rational interpretation of the content. Proving of logical contradiction existing in the dogmas of faith, achieved in the rational way, should result in rejection of the specific religious content.

### Socynians Religion Argumentation

Proposals in argumentation of Wiszowaty, which I will try to summarize in the further part of the work, are characteristic for the Arians. I will present the views of Wiszowaty based on arguments that he used in the above mentioned discussion with Leibniz. I would like to

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<sup>9</sup> A. Wiszowaty, *O religii zgodnej z rozumem, Religio rationalis*, „Doprawdy dziwić się trzeba, że ludzie, którzy są stworzeniami rozumnymi i którzy w innych przypadkach cieszą się z posiadania rozumu jako szczególnego daru Boga i tym darem posługują się w rzeczach nie tak ważnych – że ci sami ludzie nie chcą się nim posługiwać w rzeczach ważniejszych i że chętnie przymykają one oko ducha, kiedy należy spojrzeć na sprawy boskie”.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, A. Wiszowaty in *O religii zgodnej z rozumem*, emphasized: „Jeżeli rozumienie nie jest potrzebne do wierzenia, to można by po prostu powiedzieć coś do kogoś w języku obcym, tak, że słyszał by on dźwięki, ale nie rozumiał co one znaczą, a potem pytać czy wierzy w to, co mu powiedziano, czy to jako prawdę uznaje i na to się godzi. Czyż nie byłoby to niedorzeczne i śmieszne, pytam, aby ktoś zadawał takie pytanie, czy też aby zapytany odpowiedział, że wierzy w coś, czego nie rozumiał?”.

note the Antitrinitarian view, which revealed *expressis verbis* in *O religii zgodnej z rozumem*. It states there, which is also reflected in his earlier work, and here in this correspondence that there are some arising from the general reason axioms, the notion that constitute the ideas and are widely and generally true. One of these axioms, which Wiszowaty often used in the discussion, and which lists the first in the list of axioms presented in: *Religio rationalis*, is that: „*Sądy sprzeczne nie mogą jednocześnie być prawdziwe. Czyli: Co zawiera w sobie sprzeczność, to jest absolutnie nie możliwe, nawet dla największej powagi*”-„*Contradictory courts can not be simultaneously true. So: What contains in itself a contradiction, that is absolutely impossible, even for the greatest seriousness*”-which means even to God, emphasized by author.

### **Adam Gosławski against Jakub Matini argumentation**

The Wiszowaty views contain common elements with the arguments presented by Adam Gosławski, in the text which is the response to the attack of Jakub Martini (lived between: 1510-1649)-included in the work: *De tribus Elohim-O trzech osobach Boga.-About The three persons of God*. Martini's work consisted of three books, the third book was a critique of Gosławski views. Similarly to discussion between Wiszowatym and Leibniz, in the Gosławski dispute with Martini they preserved certain characteristics features for *ars disputandi*. Martini's work was published in Wittenberg in the year 1619 all three books. Martini edge of his critics aimed at the Gosławski treaty, directed against Keckerman, and specifically in the third part of the Treaty, which author devoted to considerations how should be understand the term „person” important at theology and philosophy.

In response Gosławski prepared another work, published in the year 1620 in Raków, entitled: *Rozprawa o osobie. Odpowiada się w niej na te argumenty, przy pomocy, których Jakub Martini ... w II księdze dzieła „O trzech osobach Boga” usiłuje zaprzeczać temu, co wywodzi autor traktatu przeciw Keckermannowi w części III swego traktatu, tj. zarówno na temat osoby rozumianej ogólnie, jak i definicji osoby Bożej, która to definicja, jak się zwykle mniema, została przekazana przez Justyna* (title in english: *Dissertation about the person. Responds in it to those arguments, with which Jacob Martini ... In the second book of the work „O Triune God”, trying to deny what comes from the author of the treaty against Keckermann in Part III of his treatise, ie. Both about the person, understood in general, and the definition of the person of God, which that definition, as is usually*



thinketh, was passed by Justin).<sup>11</sup> Goslawski in his reply to Martini, at part I (containing 15 chapters) deliberates about the person generally understood, and in Part II (shorter, 9 chapters) reflects on the concept of a person generally understood references to God, whether the concept of a person should and must be apply to the person of God? The aim of the author (Adam Goslawski) is to demonstrate that by definition of a person understanding generally, which must also be applied to the person of the divine, is clear that the dogma of Holy Trinity, about God having one entity, but three persons, is overthrown and can not be maintained. According Goslawski opponents, Antitrinitarians views are wicked and apply a manipulation. Finds that the previously widely accepted was that the person is a rational substance unit. Then been denied the view in which perspective the person is a „rational substance unit” - „jednostkowa substancja rozumna” and replaced it: substance - with a: samoistnienie, self-existencia (subsistentia). According Goslawski they tried to avoid by this way Charybda but run into Scylla, because they do not avoid the inconvenience, they want to avoid falling into numerous other concerns, not undermining opinion of adversaries, ie. the opponents of the dogma of the Holy Trinity. Goslawski states: „*Ci bowiem, którzy twierdzą, że osoba nie jest substancją, ale samoistnieniem (subsistentia), winni zwrócić uwagę na to, że równie niemożliwą jest rzeczą, by numerycznie jedna istota posiadała wiele samoistnie, jak to, by jedna numerycznie istota mogła istnieć jako wiele istniejących osób. Jedna bowiem rzecz posiada tylko jedną formę: otóż samoistnienie udoskonalające istotę jest formą i uzupełnieniem substancji*”. („*For those who claim that the person is not a substance, but samoistnienie (subsistentia) - self existencia, should note that as it is impossible to numerically one being held a lot of its own-exsistence, as to one numerically being could exist as many existing persons. Indeed, one thing has only one form: so the self-existence further improvement of the being is form and substance supplement*”).

Martini made a distinction between the concept of the person and the individual entity. However, even, as he states, if he will admitted that the being unit and seater („*istota jednostkowa i osobowa*”) differ from each other, despite, even in this case, it should be noted that they are to such degree related to each other, that one belongs to the concept of

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<sup>11</sup> A. Goslawski, Rozprawa o osobie. Odpowiada się na te argumenty przy pomocy, których Jakub Martini, ... w II księdze dzieła : „O trzech osobach Boga”, „... *Adami Goslari a Bebelno Disputatio De Persona. In qua Jacobo Martini, Profesori Witembergensi, ea in libro secundo de tribus Elohim refellere enitenti, quae ab auctore contra Bartholomeaum Keckermannum, parte tertia disputata sunt, tum de ratione, personae in genere sumptae, tum de definitione Divinae personae, a Justino, ut vulgo creditur, tradita, respondetur*”.

second, and it can be said that the unit being endowed with reason is a person. Goslawski agrees with the assertions that God is a person and, therefore, in his opinion, has the features of the person: *substancje, jednostkowość, rozum i niudzielność* - *substance, individuality, intelligence and indivisibility*. In this statement is consistent with the Martini, his philosophical opponent. Does not agree whereas with the statement allegedly there is a difference between the person created and the person uncreated. The notions: individual substance, a rational being, author considers as convertible. According to Goslawski to the features of the unit being, belong individuality, but also separateness, therefore the unit being, a person, even God can not be *communicabilis*. If we accept, therefore, the assumption according to which God has the qualities of a person in this connection, dogma of three-personed God will be overthrown. God as a person, and therefore the unit person, according Antitrinitarians, is indivisible (undivided) *incommunicabilis*, has rational nature – *rationalis naturae* and is an individual substance *individua substantia*. In order to clarify its position Goslawski clarifies the notion of individuality and singularity. States that the substance of God can not be shared by three individuals if God has a personal nature. Because if the dogma of the Holy Trinity, could be accepted, God does not meet the characteristics relating to the term, ie the person. *incommunicabilis*, would be therefore *communicabilis*, so would have lacked the personal nature. However, all Antitrinitarians and their opposition agreed on the fact of personal nature of God. Goslawski stated that each person requires a separate entity as the *individua substantia*. Analysis of the term the person and the reference of this issue to the characteristics God has allowed Goslawski overthrow the dogma of God, one in essence, but in three persons.

### Seven Wiszowaty arguments against Holy Trinity dogma

In Wiszowaty letter to Baron Boineburg<sup>12</sup> from October 1665, fell 7 arguments, in which Wiszowaty undermines the dogma of three persons God („Trinity”). Criticizes followers of view that supposedly one God is both: the Father, the Son (Jesus Christ), and the Holy Spirit. He claimed that in the Bible there is no confirmation of this way of thinking, and that it is a later construction. In his opinion this view: is

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<sup>12</sup> A. Wiszowaty, List do Barona Boineburga w październiku 1665, Obiekcje dotyczące Trójcy św., *Objectiones quaedam*. [in:] S. Huber, *Logika i wiara w sporze Andrzeja Wiszowatego i Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza o Trójce św.*, pp. 70-75, (lat. 85-90).

later, wrong, logically inconsistent, which must be rejected. Socinians believed also that assertion supposedly that Holy Spirit is a person is not correct. „*Po pierwsze wykazaliśmy poprzednio niezbicie, że jedna i jedyna osoba Boga nie dopuszcza w żadnym razie wielości osób*” - „*First, we have shown before conclusively that the one and only person of God does not allow in any case of a plurality of persons*” - Adami Gosławski, and further: „*Duch św. nie jest osobą, chyba, że zechcemy umieścić osobę w osobie, lecz bez prawa odwracania (albowiem Bóg nie jest w duchu swoim) co jest rzeczą zupełnie niemożliwą*” - „*Holy Spirit is not a person, unless we want to put a person in person, but without the reversal right (because God is not in his own spirit) that is clearly impossible*” - Adami Gosławski. It was claimed that the spirit is in God, just as the soul is in man, Paul said that no one knows what is in God, but only the spirit.<sup>13</sup> Jesus Christ, according to Wiszowaty is not the highest God, but he is the closest to God and subordinated to him. Thus, the adoration of Christ can not be the highest adoration but it is the closest to the highest adoration and subordinate to it. Wiszowaty Syllogism constituting argument I is as follows: „*Jeden najwyższy Bóg jest Ojcem, z którego wszystko jest. Syn Boży Jezus Chrystus nie jest Ojcem, z którego wszystko jest. Więc Syn Boży Jezus Chrystus nie jest jednym najwyższym Bogiem*” - „*One supreme God is the Father, from whom everything is. The Son of God, Jesus Christ is not the Father, from whom everything is. So the Son of God, Jesus Christ is not one supreme God*”. Wiszowaty larger premise derives from the words of the Apostle, located on the first letter to the Corinthians, which states that God is the cause of everything. God is the father, from whom everything is. Is the first person therefore the source and the cause, the first principle, from which everything originates. („*Od tych rzeczy postępuje się do poznania pierwszej przyczyny, czyli istoty najdoskonalszej, najpotężniejszej, najmądrzej, wszystko to porządkującej i regulującej, to jest Boga*” from Wisowatius *Religio rationalis*, i.e. *From these things progressing to the knowledge of the first cause, which is the essence of the most perfect, the most powerful, smartest, all ordering and regulating, it is to God*). According to Wiszowaty apostle had the best reason to proclaim the truth about the Holy Trinity. But he does not do it. Then Apostle distinguishes the Jesus Christ, from the Father from whom everything is by determining: *Jedyny Pan przez, którego wszystko jest, - One Lord by whom all is*, this statement constitutes smaller premise in Wiszowaty syllogism. In his proving Christ is not the highest Lord, because him is only God the Father, from whom everything is. God

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<sup>13</sup> Z. Ogonowski, *Socynianizm polski*, Warszawa 1960, III. Doktryna religijna: Jezus miał tylko naturę ludzką. Duch święty nie jest osobą.

made Jesus Lord and Christ, the anointed of God. A special argument for proof that Jesus is not the highest God is that works by him the supreme God, making it his second and indirect cause. Most High God is the first cause, and through him everything is.

The next Wiszowaty syllogism reads as follows: *Kto nie znał dnia sądu, ten nie jest najwyższym Bogiem. Syn nie znał dnia sądu. Więc syn nie jest najwyższym Bogiem.* - *Who does not know the day of judgment, is not the supreme God. Son did not know the day of judgment. So the son is not the highest God.* The larger premise is that omniscience is a feature of the supreme God. Therefore the one who did not know the day of judgment was not omniscient, and therefore can not be said that is the supreme God, or have existed in these assumptions inherent contradiction. The smaller premise of Wiszowaty in this syllogism, is based on the words of Jesus Christ himself, who said: „No one knows the day nor the hour” „*Nikt nie zna dnia ani godziny*”<sup>14</sup> oraz „*No one knows the day or hour, not even the angels who are in heaven, nor the Son, but only the father*”.<sup>15</sup> According to Antitrinitarian these words are a source of frustration for supporters of the idea of the substantial unity. Quoting supporters of dogma, Wiszowaty states their absurdity. Stated „*Proponują oni między innymi takie odpowiedzi: To że Syn nie znał [dnia sądu], nie należy interpretować tak, iż rzeczywiście nie znał [dnia sądu], lecz tak, że udawał, iż nie znał, że nie chciał im go objawić; że uczynił tak abyśmy nie znali [dnia sądu], że w tym momencie jeszcze nie znał dnia sądu*”- „*They propose, among other things such answers: That the Son did not know [the day of Last Judgment] should not be interpreted as that he really did not know [the day of the Last Judgment], but that he pretended that he did not know that he did not want to reveal it to them; that he did so that they do not know [the day of the Last Judgment], that at this point still did not know the day of judgment*”.

Socynianin determines the interpretations proposed by the church fathers as rather ridiculous turning. Proponents of this view, however, make a further distinction, stating that Jesus Christ has two natures, that is both man and supreme God, and therefore as a man he did not know the day of judgment, but as God knew. This view does not take Wiszowaty claiming that it is absurd, because it is assumed that the entity is also the supreme God and man, and therefore it would appear that the supreme God is a man, what is undoubtedly a contradiction. „*Bóg i człowiek są pojęciami niezgodnymi i jako takie nie mogą zostać orzeczone w sposób właściwy ani o czymś trzecim, ani też o sobie wzajemnie*”. „*God and man are*

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<sup>14</sup> Mt. XXIV, p. 36.

<sup>15</sup> Mk. XIII, p. 32.

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*concepts incompatible and as such can not be ordered properly or something third, or about each other*". According to Antitrinitarian must admit it all, if they do not misrepresent themselves reason, just as iron is not wood, soul is not the body, so also the Supreme God is not a man. But if we assume that Supreme God is a man, we should accept, also, that the greatest God is not the greatest God, it must result in charge of internal contradictions of such inference. According to Socynians Son of God did not create the world, and is not consubstantial with the Father, while the participation in the creation of the world afforded to him, in their opinion, by the imaginary common features with the highest God. If the nature of the Son is connected hypostatically<sup>16</sup> with God whether in this way the divine person did not provide the knowledge about the Mystery?<sup>17</sup> Whether the Day of Last Judgment secret was known to person of the Son, how can they say that the Son did not know it, though this person was supposed to be the Son of God-Wisowatius. In opinion of Wiszowaty from his writings result from this: *Ktokohwiek znał dzień sądu , ten jest Ojcem Jezusa Chrystusa. Syn, również jeżeli jest rozumiany jako Bóg, nie jest Ojcem Jezusa Chrystusa. Więc Syn również, jeżeli jest rozumiany jako Bóg, nie znał dnia sądu. „Anyone who knew the day of judgment, this is the Father of Jesus Christ. Son, even if it is understood as God, is not the Father of Jesus Christ. The Son also, if it is understood as God, did not know the day of judgment*". In this argument larger premise results from the words of Jesus Christ, that only the Father knows the day of judgment. Therefore whoever knows the day of judgment is the Father of Christ. The Son of God also denied that it has omniscience and denied that has the omnipotence to be able to do everything with himself. Son does not have everything from himself, but received everything from God the Father.

The third argument is based on the finding that being numerically one, separate, can not be decreed about many. It is, by definition, separate can therefore be entitled only to the individual. In this case, there would be unitary but generally. Therefore would be not

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<sup>16</sup> Hypostasis-this is the philosophy of objectification of concepts - abstraction, relies on erroneous recognition that the general concepts (ie. universals) have their counterparts in the objective reality. This means that there are real general objects - the man at all, a pet at all.

<sup>17</sup> Hypostatic union differently union seater means the relationship of the divine and human nature of Jesus Christ, after the Incarnation. Recognized as a dogma at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. According to this Jesus being one person has two natures and two wills. Unification was accomplished without changing natures (immutabiliter), without mixing (inconfuse), without separation (indivise) without disconnection (inseparabiliter).

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*incommunicabilis* but *communicabilis*. While *communicabilis* is not the feature of the person. From the assumption that God is the supreme being numerically one and unconsolidated, follows that can not be decreed about many. Trinitarians also does not say that God is not being the most unconsolidated and one in terms of number. They adjudicate it, however, about three persons, which, being a separate substance, independently of the others are the highest God. Wiszowaty says that where it would be 3 x 1 is three Gods. Trinitarians claim<sup>18</sup> that there is one God come in terms of the substance is not one in terms of person.

Wiszowaty Axioms in *Religio rationalis*, are: *Trzy razy jedno jest trzech, a nie jedno właściwie. I trzy razy jeden jest trzech, a nie jeden. Gdzie jest trzy, a prócz tego jedno, tam jest właściwie cztery.* - *Three times one is three, and no one properly. And three times one three, not one. Where is three, and besides this one, there is actually four.*

In his argument four Antitrinitarian proves contradiction in assertion that Jesus Christ could be the highest indivisible God. From the agreement on assumption that Jesus Christ is the supreme God, indivisible, would result in the view of Wiszowaty, that the Son of God, Jesus Christ is the the God Father of the Son of God. It follows from this contradiction and absurdity – in his opinion, not in opinion of the author of article. Therefore either of the premises must be false, according to the assumption that the larger premise is adhered by all Christians, smaller premise should be false. „*Najwyższy, jedyny, niepodzielny Bóg jest Ojcem Syna Bożego Pana Jezusa Chrystusa. Najwyższy, jedyny, niepodzielny Bóg jest Synem Bożym Panem Jezusem Chrystusem., Więc Syn Boży Pan Jezus Chrystus jest Ojcem Syna Bożego Pana Jezusa Chrystusa*” - „*The highest, the only indivisible God is the Father of the Son of God Jesus Christ. The highest, the only indivisible God is the Son of God, the Lord Jesus Christ, So the Son of God Jesus Christ is the Father of Son of God Lord Jesus Christ.* Is applicable here axiom proclaiming that unity is what is in itself indivisible. Thus, what is called the unity and, at the same time does not exist single separately or at the same time as separate, it can not be described as something separate because is a plurality.

Then Wiszowaty recalls the already mentioned distinction, that if the Son of God is the Son of God, is not himself his only cause but is the second person and, therefore, is not the highest God. Assumed that the Son of God may be from himself or another, but if he is from

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<sup>18</sup>W. Scherlock, *An apology for writing against Socinians, in defence of the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and incarnation in answer to a late earnest and compassionate suit for forbearance to the learned writers of some controversies at present*, London, 1693.

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another is not the supreme God. Then he is not his own principle but but results from some superior to himself rules.<sup>19</sup> If he results from the overarching principle is not the highest God, but if he does not follow from overriding principle is not the Son of God – in Andrzej Wiszowaty clarification. He mentions in sequence that what said already quoted Goslawski: „*Co przeniklinsi usilują unikać tego dylematu uciekając się do następującego rozróżnienia. Twierdzą, że Syn Boży, pod względem substancji o ile jest Bogiem, jest z siebie samego, a nie z innego; zaś pod względem osoby, o ile jest Synem, nie jest z siebie lecz z innego. Rozróżnienie to nie usuwa trudności*” - „*They try to avoid this dilemma by resorting to the following distinction. They claim that the Son of God, in terms of substance as far as he is God is from himself, and not from another; but in the terms of person, as far as he is the Son is not from himself but from another. This distinction does not remove the difficulties*”. In this case, the question is the Son of God, not about the essence of the divine on which they assume that is common for father and son. Divine being can not be the Son because it should be deny that it could be ever created. Results for Wiszowaty, from this statemen, is only that the Son of God as far as he is still the Son of God, is the second person, and therefore is not the highest God. - Because the eternal is what existed for centuries and remains constant and was not born. From this, therefore, follows that the highest God is that one who according to his divine nature, not born-this is one from axioms ascertained by Wiszowaty in *Religio rationalis*.

Another Wiszowaty caveat, presented in a letter to Baron Johann Christian von Boineburg refers to the eternal nature of the highest God, and controversy surrounding the appointment to the existence of Jesus Christ, and therefore as the Son of God, the highest substantial God, could he ever be created? Wiszowaty sees the contradictions arising from the assumption about the eternal Son of God's creation in terms of Divinity. After 1 seems absurd to say that this one, which in terms of

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<sup>19</sup> Catechism of the Catholic Church 466 Nestorian heresy saw in Christ the human person connected with the divine Person of the Son of God. Opposing this heresy, St. Cyril of Alexandria and the third ecumenical council at Ephesus in 431. confessed that „*The word, uniting by the hypostatic union with the body animated by a rational soul, became a man*” (Council of Ephesus). Christ's humanity has no other subject than the divine person of the Son of God, who assumed it and made it his own, from his beginning. On this basis, the Council of Ephesus proclaimed in 431. That Mary truly became the Mother of God by the human born of the Son of God in her womb. Mary is called the Mother of God - Theotokos, not because the Word of God took from her his divine nature, but because born from Her sacred body endowed with a spiritual soul, with which the word united hypostatically born, as they say, according to the flesh.

divinity was created was the supreme God, similar like in the statements of Adam Gosławski which we analyzed above. (*Osoba, która pochodzi od innej nie jest najwyższym Bogiem*-A person who comes from another is not the supreme God). Because like believes Wissowatii highest substance is not created. As it regards the process of creating must bind in Antitrinitarian optics to thereby produce some other entity. The process of creation must have a first principle, which takes the essence of the new beginning. If was created means that is dependent from someone other than itself, dependent from whom has own existence. These are qualities that are not entitled to the eternal, supreme God. Because no one else can be earlier than the creator God. Father takes precedence before posed Son. This opinions according to author are important not only in human affairs, but also refer to the divine essence. The general truth of these statements was admitted also by advocates of the thesis about common substance, but the resulting from this problems are related to the fact that Creator can't in the same time be created: „*When it is said that God creates God, means that God is from God, then God either creates the same numerically God, which is the same, or another one*”.<sup>20</sup> Wiszowaty states that the result of that must be that creates another God. The statement that God creates another God must mean that God is not numerically one, for Antitrinitarians. To avoid this dilemma, Trinitarians, proponents of the dogma of the Holy Trinity, add the assumption that only the person is created. Antitrinitarians however do not see this dilemma resolve in this explanation, because why the Divine Person, which is created, is no longer God? The third doubt mentioned by Wiszowaty, in the argument six of the letter, is a reflection on whether Jesus Christ was created-*generabatur*-eternally from God's essence, whether he has already been created, or maybe is still created. „*albo przestał już być stwarzany, albo nie przestał*”- „*Or he ceases to be already created, or did not stop*”. If the Son of God ceases to be already created, it would appear that the creation also had a beginning, and therefore it was not timeless, so it can not be eternal. Because what never started can not end also. But if Jesus had not ceased to be created, if is God, will be produced for ever and ever – wrote Wiszowaty. With this judgment agreed also philosophical supporters of the Holy Trinity dogma. According to Wiszowaty this is absurd, because God is not entitled to eternal becoming, because the one who is

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<sup>20</sup> „*Kiedy mówi się, że Bóg stwarza Boga, czyli że Bóg jest z Boga, wówczas Bóg albo stwarza tego samego numerycznie Boga, którym jest sam, albo innego*” - „*When it is said that God creates God, means that God is from God, then God either creates the same numerically God, which is the same, or another one*”.



constantly generated, in the sense of perfect and absolute has not been born yet.

The last argument of *opponens*, and in this role Wiszowaty in conducted whith Leibniz correspondence concerns on the Incarnation. Our hero states, Wiszowaty mentioned: „*Boskość, która jest w Bogu Ojcu, nie zstąpiła z nieba i nie jest wcielona. Boskość, która jest w Bogu Synu, zstąpiła z nieba i jest wcielona. Więc Boskość, która jest w Bogu Synu, nie jest Boskością, która jest w Bogu ojcu*”. Opposing in these sentences is that God and his Divine can not be simultaneously Incarnated and not incarnated. Sentence: „*The one supreme God is Incarnate and the one supreme God is not incarnate*” is contradictory, this thesis in Wiszowaty optics excluded itself. In Andrzej Wiszowaty opinion, which he defends, if we will assume that the supreme God and the whole Trinity is Incarnated then we come to the absurd proclaiming that not only the Son of God, but God the Father and the Holy Spirit are Incarnated, and born by the Virgin Mary. According to Wiszowaty some say so, taking as true the notion that these persons are one and not divisible God „*Niepodzielny book*” like he wrote. Then not only the second person is incarnate - Jesus - but also with him divine substance because it can not be separated from the divine person. If it turns out that incarnated is not the whole Trinity but only the second person Jesus from the Holy Trinity will by turn out that indivisible God is somehow divided, separated from himself. Would not be then entirely one and unfolded-*najprostszy simplicissimus*.

I have offered there the arguments used by Wiszowaty in the discussion waged with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in the years 1665-1669. Antitrinitarians states that if someone managed to solve these nodes, will be able to recognize that the adversary views-*respondens*-are not absurd. The discussion and the figure of Andrzej Wiszowaty gained fame thanks to that was carried out with a very well-known in the seventeenth century philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. According to Huber, Leibniz appreciated the Wiszowaty argumentations.<sup>21</sup> He saw them as a challenge to its creative potential. He expressed appreciation for the *Religio rationalis*, probably not knowing the author's personal data. Zbigniew Ogonowski said that Leibniz exaggerated the significance of philosophical doctrines of Socynians. Apparently in the criticism of the low level of argumentation, of a follower of Socinianism, Daniel Zwicker, author of a brief treaty, whose aim was to prove the internal

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<sup>21</sup> S. Huber, *Logika i wiara w sporze Andrzeja Wiszowatego i Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza o Trójce św., Szacunek okazany Wiszowatemu przez Leibniza (Respect shown by Leibniz to Andrzej Wiszowaty)*, pp. 49-50.

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contradictions of the dogma of the Trinity, Leibniz, preserved in unusual for himself, emotional way, stating that he knows many subtle and modest Socynian. Huber supposes that then he had on mind Andrzej Wiszowaty. Presented exchange of views gives us the opportunity to observe philosophical premises, which require from Wiszowaty rejection of the Holy Trinity dogma. The discussion, which Antitrinitarian arguments were put forward, bounced of a big echo in the environment of European theologians and philosophers, mainly due to the fame which enjoyed, decades later, Leibniz. Became known in Germany, thanks to Lessing, who was editor and commentator of dispute about the Holy Trinity, as well as an advocate of tolerance, writer of the German Enlightenment. Lessing praised Leibniz for taking the fight for arguments with Wiszowaty and Socynians views, considered as harmful, claimed that Wiszowaty is the creator of the terrible syllogisms (*der treffliche Wissowatius*). Lessing's interest, resulted in the second discovery of the debate conducted in the seventeenth century. This time by Wilhelm Dilthey,<sup>22</sup> philosopher of art of understanding, Hermeneutics. With Wiszowaty arguments not agree anyone outside the Arian community, but it seemed interesting because of the logical structure.

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<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, Kilka uwag o recepcji i wydaniach, pp. 13-16.