

## ETHICAL VIEW ON SLOVAK, HUNGARIAN AND ROMA RELATIONS IN SLOVAKIA IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTICULTURALISM

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**Abstract:** *This paper deals with the ethical view on the possibilities of coexistence of Slovaks, Hungarians and Roma people in Slovakia. The history of coexistence of the three ethnic groups in Slovakia is briefly discussed. The paper is based on Kant's concept of culture associated with the idea of morality. It also considers the viability of the concept of multiculturalism. It considers it non-functional. Here it relies on the arguments posed by Dupkalo, namely the division of cultures into value commensurable and incommensurable. The paper attempts to characterize relations between Slovaks and Hungarians and relations between Slovaks and Roma. It concludes that the interpersonal relations between the Hungarians and the Slovaks are conflict-free and that conflicts in the past were of a highly political nature. On the contrary, the relationship between Roma and Slovaks differentiates according to whether it is an adaptable part of the Roma or not. In the latter case, the root of the problem is value incommensurability.*

**Keywords:** intercultural relations, value commensurability of cultures, multiculturalism, Hungarian minority, Roma minority.

If multiculturalism is to be discussed, first it is necessary to define the concept of culture. There are several definitions of the term culture. In the European context, perhaps the oldest way of grasping the term culture comes from the sophists, where they distinguished between what is physei, ie. nature and what nomoi is, ie. what comes from man. "That momentous distinction which characterized the 5th century in Greece and created the conditions for the birth of political theory: the distinction between νόμοι and φύσις or, more precisely, between what is valid or just by 'nature' and what is valid or just by 'law' or 'convention'"<sup>1</sup>. Similarly, in this distinction the basis of the term culture could be sought, that is, what is by nature is not culture, but it is what can be found in the world and has its origin from man. However, is the concept of culture necessarily and exclusively determined by its relation to man? Is it possible to separate this concept from man even if human personal identity is treated as a sociocultural construct highly dependent on culture?<sup>2</sup> Is it possible to extend it eventually?

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<sup>1</sup> Giovanni Giorgini, „The power of speech: The influence of the sophists on Greek politics”, in *Studies in Moral Philosophy*, (2016), p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Ingrida Vaňková, *Život ako Story - Ja ako text: naratívne perspektívy v skúmaní osobnej identity človeka*, Prešov, Prešovská univerzita v Prešove, (2017).

In this context, there is an interesting dispute over the values of human life that has been transformed into convex form by Australian philosopher Peter Singer<sup>3</sup>. The basic question is whether the value of a living creature is measured according to its level of consciousness or its value lies in belonging to a human species. Regarding speciesism, Singer critically points out that if it were by species only, then eventually higher intelligence could take precedence over man, if it were more robust, it would reach higher indicators. The hypothetical problem of this question proves more convincing if the problem of Turing's artificial machine intelligence test is opened up, followed by criticism through Searle's Chinese room paradox. The point is to find a criterion for identifying the thinking of artificial intelligence. Turing attempted to rehabilitate the author of this study with the argument of a machine that generates existential questions of Heidegger provenance. The hypothetical problem in question are certainly complicated by the original primordial attempts to grasp culture as principally and sovereignly human area. The eventuality of another unknown form of life is complicated by the fact of its phenomenal rarity in terms of development. Krempaský has shown that the process of developing life from and inanimate substance is very unlikely<sup>4</sup>. The extremely low probability of the self-creation of life (in various regions of the universe) appears to be weakened by the falsification of the principled irreversibility of stochastic thermodynamic processes in the sense of I. Prigogin's interpretation, as demonstrated by the Turkmen physicist M. M., however, such weakening is not significant<sup>5</sup>. Despite the conclusions of Mamedov, such a possibility can be considered as extremely improbable and continually allow only the possibility of independent thinking within the framework of future artificial intelligence.

I exclude the definition of culture as an area of nature (Thomas Hobbes) as absurd. Kant seemed to understand the nature of culture much better than Hobbes. Kant calls the second step of reason a fig leaf used by Adam and Eve to cover their nakedness. The view of sophists is very similar. But Kant also opens up another aspect of culture, an aspect of morality. „Thus are taken the first true steps from barbarism to culture, which consists in the social worth of man; thence gradually develop all talents, and taste is refined; through continued enlightenment

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<sup>3</sup> Peter Singer, „Killing humans and killing animals”, in *Inquiry* nr. 1-4, (1979).

<sup>4</sup> Július Krempaský, *Kresťan v tretom tisícročí*, Bratislava, Lúč, 2016.

<sup>5</sup> Murad M. Mamedov, On the incorrectness of the traditional proof of the prigogine principle of minimum entropy production, in *Technical Physics Letters* nr. 4, (2003).

the beginnings are laid for a way of thought which can in time convert the coarse, natural disposition for moral discrimination into definite practical principles, and thereby change a society of men driven together by their natural feelings into a moral whole<sup>6</sup>. Thus, Kant perceives culture as being different from nature and given by man. This definition of culture, very similar to that of the sophists, namely Hippias of Elida and adopted by Kant, can be considered valid. However, it should not be perceived uncritically, as in the future the thinking of machines that can create something of their own cannot be excluded. Their products of thought, if they occur, will certainly not be the products of nature. Therefore, this definition can be perceived as species non-specific, ie. open to potentially thinking artificial intelligence. The above definition was chosen for it provided a relevant argument, but it must remain an open system, it must remain plausible. Kant's addendum on the idea of morality will be discussed below.

Multiculturalism is a frequently discussed topic.<sup>7</sup> Classical multiculturalism is a doctrine in which there is a society composed of a mix of different ethnicities, races, cultures, nations and ethnic groups. Multiculturalism itself has its roots partly in Marxism, as Marx came up with the idea of removing classes. But the idea is old, it originally comes from the utopian socialists like Morus, Campanella, F. Bacon. Sorel's idea of class cooperation could also be inspiring as an eventual source.

We recognize several kinds of multiculturalism. „Conservative multiculturalism is the belief that everyone should be better off adopting the living standards of the “white middle class”<sup>8</sup>. Coming from France and building on some ideas of the French Revolution, liberal multiculturalism, in turn, wants to integrate different individuals. “Among liberal multiculturalists, there is a relative consensus about cultural membership as the relevant criterion for distributing cultural policies”<sup>9</sup>. The British model is slightly different. „It proclaims the coexistence model “the integration of the different”, but takes the view that the members of different social and cultural groups should retain their specificities”<sup>10</sup>. Essential multiculturalism is perceived as an

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<sup>6</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, passim.

<sup>7</sup> Pavol Tišliar, *Muzeológia na Slovensku*, in *Muzeológia a kultúrne dedičstvo* nr. 1, (2016), p. 127.

<sup>8</sup> Alica Harajová, *Multikulturalizmus – realita či idea?*, in *Revue spoločenských a humanitných vied* nr. 2, (2015), p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Annamari Vitikainen, *Liberal multiculturalism group membership and distribution of cultural policies*, in *Ethnicities* nr. 1, p. 53.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 5.

essential cultural and national identity of marginalized groups. Critical multiculturalism is a kind of application of postmodern destruction of meta-stories and eternal truths for the benefit of socio-cultural diversity.

The authors Ng Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten believe that “the meaning and impact of cultural diversity ideologies for intergroup relations depend on the national context”<sup>11</sup>. Personally, I consider traditional multiculturalism dead, difficult to apply and principally harmful. The argument is to use the concept of value and common sharing of such values. The traditional notion of multiculturalism is based on the assumptions that meeting and influencing new cultures presuppose that they can become commensurable values and be able to live within one society. This seems like a utopia.

Philosopher Dupkala offers particular solution. One solution in his concept is to offer a reformulated and reinterpreted concept of axiological pluralism, based on two assumptions: 1. quantitative (many) value systems, which in general form the structural core of different cultures; 2. people professing a number of specific values that – within the system – can have absolute or relative validity in individual (specific) systems<sup>12</sup>. However, this solution is only possible for certain cultures that exhibit certain characteristics. In mutual relations, it is possible to divide two or more cultures into two relationship groups: as value-commensurable and value-incommensurable. This represents their mutual symmetry in terms of living together in one society. While the commensurability of values is determined by their interconnection and functional comparability, according to some – commonly respected – standards, the incommensurability of values is based on their discontinuity. Therefore, the commensurability of values allows a bridge to be formed between them. Non-commensurable values – in the collective “world order” – cannot be bridged with those commensurable. This phenomenon is a potential source of intercultural conflicts. Cultures that have commensurable values can live together in one territory and in one state. Incommensurable cultures can only live together at the expense of permanent conflicts. Therefore, it is more sensible to separate them, ie. they can live side by side without difficulty, but not together<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> Caroline Ng Tseung-Wong, Maykel Verkuyten, Diversity ideologies and intergroup attitudes: When multiculturalism is beneficial for majority group members, in *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* nr. 2, (2018), p. 336.

<sup>12</sup> Rudolf Dupkala, *Next Europe in the context of immigration*, Pardubice, Helios, (2017).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*.

Let us apply these theoretical arguments to the specific situation of the Hungarian and Roma minorities in Slovakia. We can focus on the most traditional Slovak national minorities. Due to space constraints, our brief analysis will only concern Hungarians and Roma people. The first significant minority encountered by Slovak ancestors in the 9<sup>th</sup> century was the Hungarians. “There is no doubt about the presence of old Hungarians in the territory of southern Slovakia immediately after the fall of Great Moravia”<sup>14</sup>. The breakthrough became especially the X. century. They lived for a while as neighbors, yet it was not peaceful coexistence. “The Great Moravian oral tradition about the state and the Moravian-Hungarian relationship preserved in Hungarian Kingdom”<sup>15</sup>. Living in a nomadic way of life, they threatened Central, Western and Southern Europe. The Hungarians, initially commanded by the central chief, did not have a fixed territory or a state unit with permanent borders. When only a few wounded warriors dragged back from the battle of Lech, which the Hungarians lost to Otto I in 955, it was clear that it was necessary to change the way of life. In this way, the people who lived nomadically and used only pastoralism in agriculture turned to the settled agricultural way of life. The influence of traditional *gyula* and *horka* functions within the ruling elite declined, while the influence of central power strengthened. Gejza became the founder of the Hungarian state. The change that took place necessarily affected the relations of the Hungarians and the predecessors of the Slovaks<sup>16</sup>.

The Principality, which still existed from the Mojmiris, apparently passed continuously into the nascent Hungarian Principality. It kept its original position until the beginning of the 12<sup>th</sup> century. At that time, clashes culminated between King Koloman and his brother Álmoš. After long fights, Álmoš and his son Belo were captured and blinded. “King Koloman deposed the last Prince of Nitra in 1108 and abolished and decomposed the Principality himself in two years”<sup>17</sup>. The Principality has disappeared for good. The territory of Slovakia, which coincided to some extent with the Principality, formally had no indication of individuality in terms of the history of the administration.

“The southern part of the country, neighbouring the Hungarian ethnic group, had the character of an ethnically mixed territory with the

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<sup>14</sup> Peter Ratkoš, *Pramene k dejinám Veľkej Moravy*, Bratislava, SAV, (1968), p. 18.

<sup>15</sup> Ryszard Grzesik, Which kind of tradition was used by the Hungarians to form their historical identity?, in *Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana* nr. 1, (2019), p. 143.

<sup>16</sup> Ján Tibenský, *Slovensko Dejiny*, Bratislava, Obzor, (1971).

<sup>17</sup> Ján Steinhübel, *Nitrianske kniežatstvo*. Bratislava: SAV, (2004), p. 328.

Slovak and Hungarian inhabitants since the 10th century”<sup>18</sup>. Although cultural differences were initially considerable, the relationship between Hungarians and Slovaks was not complicated for centuries. After the Hungarians settled, they moved to the agricultural way of life, the same as the predecessor of the Slovaks. During the reign of the first king Stephen the christianization of the Hungarians was completed. These phenomena largely approximated the cultural orientation of both ethnic groups. The invasion of the Mongols and the later attack by the Turks depopulated many Hungarian-speaking lowlanders. Resettlement by the inhabitants of Slavic and German origin further mixed the territory in which the Hungarians lived. Although, with some exceptions, these residents later assimilated among Hungarians, they even neutralized cultural differences to an even greater extent.

Throughout the Middle Ages and long into modern times, national differences were not substantial. The anti-Habsburg uprisings were about removing the influence of a foreign dynasty and religion, not a national struggle. This lasted until the 18<sup>th</sup> century, but even then, national differences did not mean any national hostilities. The change occurred in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Lajos Kossuth, a capable Hungarian revolutionary, though he had many truly progressive ideas, on the other hand, ignored non-Hungarian nationalities. His political thinking is conceptually examined by Miru<sup>19</sup>. The head of the National Revival of the Slovaks Ľudovít Štúr did not find an agreement with Kossuth. “Štúr and Kossuth were probably most connected by their evangelical confessional background”<sup>20</sup>. Because of their opposition to nationalities, they became ideological and later also war enemies. Ideological leaders of Hungarians and Slovaks met against each other in armed struggle in three Slovak volunteer expeditions.

However, this did not mean a major break in relations among common people. It is known that many Slovaks fought in Kossuth’s army. Thus, this conflict influenced relations among ordinary citizens even less. The cultural values of Hungarians and Slovaks are commensurable, they have a common religion, although the proportion

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<sup>18</sup> Jolana Darulová, Katarína Košťalová, Katarína Slobodová Nováková, Cultural and confessional specifics of national minorities of Slovakia as a part of identity examples of urban and rural environment, in *European Journal of Science and Theology* nr. 6, (2018), p. 110.

<sup>19</sup> György Miru, From liberalism to democracy Key concepts in Lajos Kossuth's political thought, in *East Central Europe* nr. 1, (2014).

<sup>20</sup> Ivan Halász, *Uhorskó a podoby slovenskej identity v dlhom 19. storočí*, Bratislava, Kalligram, (2011), p. 121.

of Protestant denominations is higher in Hungary than in Slovakia. Nevertheless, culturally, both nations are very close. “The Slovak national identity was born in the long-term process of mutual interaction and influence of two basic identities, the Hungarian and Slavic ones”<sup>21</sup>. International relations between ordinary citizens are best represented by the high number of mixed Slovak-Hungarian marriages in both Slovakia and Hungary. Political relations have undergone many turbulences. From mutual hostility in the revolutionary years 1848-1849, through the antagonism of the old school of the Slovak and Hungarian political elites, the attempts of the new school of Slovak for correct relations with the Hungarian political representation, the departure of the Slovak national Party to political passivity, to the establishment of Czechoslovakia, the political relations were not favourable. The new Slovak school sought to understand the Hungarians in the period after the settlement. “The aim of the movement was to gain the confidence of the Hungarians in creating a nationally equal and independent Hungary”<sup>22</sup>.

Similarly, after the establishment of Czechoslovakia, political relations were not ideal. The situation was also complicated by the establishment of the Slovak Republic. This state body with Marxist ideology was in fact a satellite of the Republic of Hungary. “The Slovak Republic liked to grow up quite naturally from the real conditions given by the existence of a revolutionary government in Hungary”<sup>23</sup>. The Hungarian political elite had a certain representation in Slovakia. It consisted mainly of the Provincial Christian-Socialist Party and the Hungarian National Party, which merged in 1936<sup>24</sup>. Although diplomatic relations existed both between Czechoslovakia and Hungary and between Slovakia and Hungary, inter-state relations were not good. Relations deteriorated even after the collapse of Czechoslovakia. Spying affairs, such as the Sznasz affair, the occupation after the Vienna Arbitration and the Little War have greatly aggravated inter-state relations. The Sznaczký’s affair only worsened the reputation of Slovak Prime Minister Tuka. Long ago, “V. Tuka’s name was associated with magyars, and thanks to the 1929 trial he was regarded as Hungarian

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<sup>21</sup> Kristína Papcunová, *Postoje Slovákov voči maďarskej menšine*. Praha, Charles University, (2013), p. 22.

<sup>22</sup> Ivan Mrva, *Slovensko a Slováci v 2. polovici 20. storočia*. Bratislava, Perfekt, (2010), p. 121.

<sup>23</sup> Jozef Klimko, *Slovenská republika rád*, Bratislava: Pravda, (1979), p. 92.

<sup>24</sup> Ľubomír Lipták, *Politické strany na Slovensku 1860-1989*, Bratislava, Archa, (1992).

agent”<sup>25</sup>. Even the parallel existence of the Slovak National Party in Hungary and the Hungarian & national Party in Slovakia did not reverse the situation. “The Hungarian Party in Slovakia (Szlovenszkói Magyar Párt) with its head János Eszterházy, was more or less suffered as a reciprocal factor for the approval of the Party Slovak National Unity existing in the territory of Horthy Hungary”<sup>26</sup>.

After World War II there were other adverse circumstances. The retribution judiciary arrested 4764 Hungarians for alleged cooperation with Horthy, or Szálassy’s regime<sup>27</sup>. Reslovakization has many times been given the grotesque form of artificial slovakization of ethnic Hungarians. Population exchange has often been violent. Apart from the majority of the German minority, some 70.000 Hungarian people were displaced. “Hungarian State refused to accept on its national territory its citizens, the citizens of Hungarian nationality for whom it was a homeland and to whom it granted Hungarian citizenship”<sup>28</sup>. Tens of thousands of workers were transferred to the Czech border lands from Slovakia, which also affected Slovak Hungarians<sup>29</sup>. Although the original plan for a complete exchange has not been fulfilled, the violent movement of the population has not contributed to the improvement of political relations. It was only after the coup in February that political relations were gradually settled. “Since autumn 1948, the Slovak Hungarians has become emancipated. The Hungarians were equal with Slovaks”<sup>30</sup>. Yet, there are still some problematic events. E. g. in the founding phase of the period of socialism, the relocation of unreliable persons from the borderland took place. The Slovak political elite during the events in Hungary in 1956 behaved coldly restrained<sup>31</sup>. “The Hungarian Revolution, with only minor exceptions, did not evoke public sympathy in Slovakia”<sup>32</sup>. There were historical memories and fears of possible revisionism. “The cases in which the members of the

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<sup>25</sup> Peter Fedorčák, *Tuka proti republike proces z roku 1929*, Bratislava: Marenčin (2018), p. 17.

<sup>26</sup> Ivan Kamenec, *Slovenský štát v obrazoch*, Praha, Ottovo nakladatelství, (2008), p. 43.

<sup>27</sup> Michal Barnovský, *Na ceste k monopolu moci*. Bratislava: Archa, (1993), p. 120.

<sup>28</sup> Jozef Beňa, *Slovensko a Benešove dekréty*. Bratislava, Belimex, (2002), p. 94.

<sup>29</sup> Miroslav Londák, *Ekonomické reformy v Československu v 50. a 60. rokoch 20. storočia a slovenská ekonomika*. Bratislava: SAV, (2010), p. 47.

<sup>30</sup> Katalin Vadkerty, *Maďarská otázka v Československu 1945-1948*, Bratislava: Kalligram, (2002), p. 463.

<sup>31</sup> Jan Pešek, *Odvrátená tvár totality*. Bratislava: Nadácia Milana Šimečku, (1998), p. 124-129.

<sup>32</sup> Michal Barnovský, *Prvá vlna destalinizácie a Slovensko*. Brno: Prius, (2002), p. 109.

Communist Party were in favour of Hungarian Revolution or Polish reforms and demanded a similar course of radical destalinization in the Communist Party policy are only rarely mentioned”<sup>33</sup> For the Czechoslovak political elite, year 1956 meant the consolidation of positions, mainly due to the situation in Hungary. “The events in Hungary allowed the Communist Party leadership to strengthen its positions of power which had been strongly shaken since spring 1956”<sup>34</sup>. Hungarian People’s Republic also participated at the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. From the 1950s onwards, however, the correct inter-state relations were continually formed which prevailed until the fall of socialism. With the advent of a democratic establishment, tensions have escalated again during some periods, yet it never reached the level from the period before 1950s.

Both Hungarians and Slovaks have commensurable values, which consist of a traditional family, a Christian belief, and a positive national orientation. Based on an analysis of 34 individual interviews with the members of the Hungarian political, economic and cultural elite, it has been found out “that egalitarian partnership norms which were discussed in every narrative and gender equality appear in most cases as a norm among the elite”<sup>35</sup>. Their coexistence in terms of minorities in both countries proved to be possible. The nation and language are also a strong value for Hungarians. In this sense, the viability of Hungarian enclaves has also proved to be feasible abroad, e. g. in Australia<sup>36</sup>. The country’s constitutional identity in Hungary refused to relocate refugees in the state, as was also confirmed by the Constitutional Court<sup>37</sup>. National identity as a value persists among Hungarians even e. g. in Moldova despite the low position in social stratification and low educational qualifications compared to Orthodox Romanian people<sup>38</sup>. New identities in contemporary “favour a culturalist, conservative interpretation of the nation and reject humanitarian universalism,

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<sup>33</sup> Jiří Pernes, *Kříže komunistického režimu v Československu v 50. letech 20. století*, Brno, CDK, (2008), p. 166.

<sup>34</sup> Jan Pešek, *Slovensko v rokoch 1953-1957*, Brno: Prius, (2001), p. 23.

<sup>35</sup> Bernadett Csurgó, Luca Kristof, Narrative Identities and the Egalitarian Norm Among Hungarian Elite Couples, in *Journal of Family Issues* nr. 7, (2018), p. 2107.

<sup>36</sup> Petra Andits, Struggling for cultural survival: Hungarian identity discourses in the face of assimilation, in *Australian Journal of Anthropology* nr. 3, (2017).

<sup>37</sup> Gábor Halmai, The Hungarian national(ist) constitutional identity, in *Quaderni Costituzionali* nr. 1, (2017).

<sup>38</sup> Peti Lehel, Language mixture and new identity in a Moldavian Hungarian settlement, in *Ethnographia* nr. 1, (2017).

epitomized by the European Union's decision to welcome the refugees"<sup>39</sup>.

Although the Slovak enclaves in Hungary do not reach the numbers of Hungarian settlement in Slovakia, the Slovak minority in Hungary is significant. "Regarding the ethnic identification of members of the Slovak minority, we consider it important to emphasize the fact that, based on the latest data from the last census in Hungary (February 2001), the Slovak population in Hungary has increased in terms of public declaration of nationality to the Slovak minority. The official statistics of 2001 recorded an almost 70% increase in the indicator of Slovak nationality compared to the 1990 census, even though the filling in of these data was "optional" in the census sheets and given to consideration to every citizen"<sup>40</sup>. The mutual relations of the two commensurable minorities have proved to be correct. I think that both Slovaks and Hungarians can live together in one state, either in Slovak or Hungarian, for their values are commensurable. Centuries of experience are the proof of this. If problems arose, they were of a highly political nature, they did not take the form of tensions at the interpersonal level, which would be justified by different cultural values, or different lifestyle between Hungarians and Slovaks.

The Roma appeared in Slovakia in the 14<sup>th</sup> century. In fact, until the 20<sup>th</sup> century they lived separately, with a few exceptions. In the centuries before, the mixed Slovak-Roma family was a major exception. Slovak Roma are divided into two larger groups, Rumungri (Hungarian Roma) and Vlach Roma. Attempts by the Enlightened Habsburgs to assimilate the Roma almost completely failed, the success was only marginal. Some groups of Roma travelled in our territory until 1959, when it was forbidden by law. Although the 20<sup>th</sup> century meant a significant increase in mixed Slovak-Roma marriages, settlements, work habits and the transition to the way of life of the majority, it still cannot be claimed as a nationwide phenomenon. The Roma minority is the most problematic minority that lives in Slovakia. The significant unemployment, social exclusion, life in ghettos and settlements separated from the majority prevails. However, this does not apply to the entire

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<sup>39</sup> Aliaksei Kazharski, The end of 'central Europe'? The rise of the radical right and the contestation of identities in Slovakia and the Visegrad four, in *Geopolitics* nr. 4, (2018), p. 754.

<sup>40</sup> Mária Homišinová, Intergenerational changes in ethnic identification of the Slovak intelligence living in Hungary (the results of sociological research), in : *Individual and Society* nr. 4, (2002).

Roma minority, but only to its part. “At the same time, we consider it necessary to emphasize that the issue of diversity, diversity of cultural identities, ethnic and racial differences is a sensitive issue, as it has been abused in the past in the form of various racist theories and forms of racism”<sup>41</sup>. Why do problems persist with part of the Roma minority?

The roots can be found in the past in a way of life that has not changed for centuries and which has persisted in many Roma as deeply rooted. For example, some groups of Roma have a rumour that Christ was originally to be crucified by four nails, but one was stolen by Roma. Since then the Roma have been allowed to steal. The Roma have specific traditional features of culture, which distinguish them to a large extent from the Slovaks. Let’s specify at least some: Parents do not support further study of their children. There are several reasons for this: fear of the unknown environment; distrust of the educational institutions of the majority, but also the financial profit of the family (founding a family, living together); a typical example of social stratification of a settlement – from luxury houses to nearly a century-old huts; recently weakened traditional customs and the disappearance of divination and sorcery, but there remains a belief in “ill-wish” (by sight), a belief in folk medicine, and the knowledge of occultism; considerable lack of reading of literature as such; considerable deviation from the Catholic faith of the majority; the presence of animism in every social stratum regardless of religion or membership in a religious group<sup>42</sup>. It is not incorrect to note that “the differences between groups, especially the Roma ethnic group, are so large that the term “Roma problem” or its euphemism “Roma issue” is often used in this context<sup>43</sup>.

A significant part of the Roma deviated from the above values and adapted to the majority population. This part of the Roma lives in contact with the majority population without apparent problems. It can be believed that a certain part of the Roma community still has some values that are incompatible with the values of the Slovak majority, but also of other minorities. For this reason, part of the Roma population can live together with the Slovak majority only at the cost of tensions

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<sup>41</sup> Lýdia Lehoczka, *Odborné a vedecké diskurzuy o kultúrnej identite Rómov*, in Katarína Vaňková, *Odlíšnosti by nás mali spájať, nie rozdeľovať*, Nitra, Sponka, (2014), p. 88.

<sup>42</sup> Michal Kozubík, *Kultúra Rómov v minulosti a súčasnosti*, in Katarína Vaňková, *Odlíšnosti by nás mali spájať, nie rozdeľovať*, Nitra, Sponka, (2014), p. 54 – 58.

<sup>43</sup> Kvetoslava Matlovičová et al., *The Roma population in Slovakia. Basic characteristics of the Roma population with emphasis on the spatial aspects of its differentiation*, in *Roma population on the peripheries of the Visegrad countries. Spatial trends and social challenges*, Debrecen, Didakt, (2012), p. 103.

conflicts and problems. Therefore, segregation of this part of the Roma in settlements and ghettos persists. Anthropologist Scheffel points to some cases of Roma segregation and the departure of the majority population from certain micro-regions in Slovakia. “As demographic change shifts the balance of power in favour of the Roma, more and more rural ‘whites’ are fleeing the increasingly ‘coloured’ countryside in search of racial purity offered by ethnically cleansed towns and cities – an interesting process that goes in the opposite direction from the pattern prevalent in Western Europe”<sup>44</sup>. He also points out that some residents are delineating de-facto 'whites only' neighbourhoods where Roma are not tolerated. However, this cannot become a general claim. Another part of the Roma, on the other hand, seamlessly changes to the way of life of the majority and take over their values. Taking over the values of the majority in connection with the transition to a situation in which mutual values between Slovaks and Roma will be commensurable is the only way to ensure the possibility of living for the Slovaks and Roma in one community. Otherwise, it is not possible for all Roma and Slovaks to live together within one community without any conflict. The adaptable part of the Roma showed that the problem may not be unsolvable. The solution proposed by the earlier Slovak theorist Július Alexy could be helpful: to take the small Roma from the settlements to boarding and education, returning them to the settlement and ghettos only for the weekend. I consider this proposal progressive. It would mean a gradual transition of future Roma generations to the adoption of a value scale that is commensurable with the majority population.

Kant said that the idea of morality also belongs to culture. This is understood in a very specific way in the non-adaptable part of the Roma. The transition to the way of life of the majority is their chance to end the so-called Roma problem.

The role of the state is to eliminate unwanted manifestations, which are a hallmark of individuals regardless of nationality. The role of the state is also to participate in education.<sup>45</sup> My view is that the state should use the possible means to raise and educate incommensurable marginalized groups if their behaviour is problematic and shows the signs of criminalization and parasitism. Of course, the value orientation

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<sup>44</sup> David Scheffel, Ethnic micropolitics in Eastern Europe: A case study from Slovakia's Gypsy archipelago, in *Anthropology Today* nr. 4, (2008), p. 25.

<sup>45</sup> Pavol Tišliar, Inštitucionalizácia pamäťových a fondových zariadení v 50. a 60. rokoch 20. storočia v okrese Rožňava Príspevok k výskumu regionálnej kultúrnej politiky a kultúrnej stratégie, in *Muzeológia a kultúrne dedičstvo* nr. 2, (2016), p. 76.

should be maintained, but not if it is a direct guide to standards of behaviour with signs of crime and parasitism. In this I perceive the question of freedom and limitations of the relationship between state and cultural indicators of nations and ethnic groups. I also perceive such unwanted behavioural models as contradictory to Kant's morality idea.

Oskolkov believes that "multiculturalism, seen as a set of policy measures aimed at integrating migrants, remains by far the most effective ethnopolitical governance strategy"<sup>46</sup>. I disagree with him. I consider multiculturalism to be inoperative and outdated, especially in its ultraliberal forms. It is not just a subjective opinion. "Over the last decade, major European leaders have publicly stated that multiculturalism in their countries has failed"<sup>47</sup>. The argument is that incommensurable cultures simply cannot live together in the sense a united community, but only in a segregated way, separately, otherwise there are permanent conflicts and tensions. Ultraliberalism perceives values often in a very relativistic way, the only value that remains is almost absolute freedom. Conservatism is admitted to several traditional values. That is why I am in favour of conservatism and not liberalism.

"Persuaded by the critique of cultural essentialism, many critics believe that there is no defensible way of identifying distinct cultures, or of distinguishing cultural loss from cultural change, that is compatible with the normative agenda of multiculturalism"<sup>48</sup>. As Dupkala has shown, multiculturalism presents considerable disadvantages in the form of forced coexistence of incommensurable cultures. Its advantage is mutual cultural enrichment. In terms of incommensurable cultures, the disadvantage far exceeds the advantage. Only commensurable cultures can live together in a community without separation, and "deeper understanding of the moral background"<sup>49</sup>. Multiculturalism is the idea of coexistence of any culture. Without permanent problems I do not consider it possible. Therefore, I do not consider multiculturalism to be viable and sustainable.

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<sup>46</sup> Petr V. Oskolkov, Multiculturalism and the European far-right: Looking for the Other, in *Sovremennaya Evropa* nr. 3, (2019), p. 90.

<sup>47</sup> Angeliki Mikelatou, Eugenia Arvanitis, Multiculturalism in the European Union: A failure beyond redemption?, in *International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations* nr. 1, (2019), p. 1.

<sup>48</sup> Alan Patten, Rethinking culture: The social lineage account, in *American Political Science Review* nr. 4, (2011), p. 735.

<sup>49</sup> Tibor Mahrik, Roman Kralik, Igor Tavilla. Ethics in the light of subjectivity - Kierkegaard and Levinas, in *Astra Salvensis*, nr. 2, (2018), p. 488.

Kant's idea of morality connected with his conception of culture is certainly correct. I consider multiculturalism to be wrong because it demands the coexistence of ethnic groups, nations and nationalities, regardless of their values orientation. From this point of view, we consider it moral to assess the coexistence of the incommensurable value communities only at the cost of persistent conflicts and tensions. We also consider it moral if the value-incommensurable communities do not live directly together, but only side by side. The community of Slovaks and Hungarians is generally commensurable in values, so it is problem-free at the level of coexistence of the population. This can be proved apodictically and it is also confirmed by an empirical experience. The coexistence of a part of the Roma who have shifted their values to the position of the majority population in Slovakia with Slovaks is equally problem-free. The coexistence of the part of the Roma whose value orientation is incommensurable with that of the Slovaks is problematic in terms of living together. That is why we encounter the phenomena also pointed out by the anthropologist Scheffel. The only solution can be seen in finding a way to move the incoming Roma generations to value position commensurable with the position of most Slovaks. The harmonization of values, in my opinion, eliminates the phenomenon that some refer to as the "Roma problem". It would mean a smooth coexistence of Slovaks and the two largest minorities living in Slovakia.

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